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ABSTRACT
An exploratory study of the housing allocation system in the
Leningrad was undertaken in order to evaluate the
feasibility of the Soviet Government's recent proposal to
privatize approximptely 70% of the state-owned housing stock
by the year 2000. The study included an analysis of the
centralized political and planning processes as well as an
evaluation the socioeconomic and cultural environment in
the Soviet Union.
The results of the study indicated that expanding the
non-state housing sector is not a panacea for the Soviet
housing problems. If the situation in Leningrad is
representative, the housing problem is merely a subset of a
much greater set of problems which pervade the political,
economic and cultural fabric of Soviet society. Without
restructuring the centralized planning and political
processes and the socialized economy, for instance, any move
toward privatization would be impotent. Furthermore, because
market economics depends on consumer values, the
long-standing tradition of collectivism and authority and the
institutionalized inequalities which pervade Soviet society
would need to shift for privatization to succeed.
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S...other havens.. .were and remain the homes of friends:
Those padded, intimate interiors whose snug warmth is all
the more comforting after the raw bleakness of the nation's
public spaces; those tiny flats steeped in the odor of dust
and refried kasha in which every gram of precious space is
filled, every scrap of matter -- icons, crucifixes, ancient
wooden dolls, unmatched teacups preserved since before the
Revolution -- is stored and gathered against the loss of
memory; those homes which even in times of greatest dearth
have centered about a table, about food miraculously foraged
for the visiting relative or guest; those tables over which,
until the Gorbachev era, one engaged in elaborate mimicries,
note-passing, sign language, to escape the scrutiny of the
state's murderers and spies. Over the years, such Soviet
homes, however poor, beleaguered, continued to exemplify
those virtues that underlie the national tradition of
uyutnost: that dearest of Russian words, approximated by our
'coziness'... [which] denotes the Slavic talent for creating
a tender environment even in dire poverty and with the most
modest means; it is associated with intimate scale, with
small dark space2, with women's domestic generosity, with a
nurturing love."
INTRODUCTION
According to Article 44 of the Constitution of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, all Soviet citizens have a right
to housing.3 Under perestroika, the Soviet government has
acknowledged the inadequacy of its ability to fulfill this
right.4 In March of 1986, at the 27th Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev
proclaimed that every Soviet family would have a separate
dwelling by the year 2000.
As of 1989, government estimates revealed that there were
approximately 83 million housing units serving the
republic's 90 million households.5 By the year 2000, the
number of households is forecasted to increase to 97 million,
and the current housing stock is estimated to depreciate by
11%-16%. Thus, in order to achieve Mr. Gorbachev's goal,
approximately 20-25 million new units must be constructed.
By U.S. standards, this figure is staggering. However, the
Soviet government has proven its ability to produce enormous
quantities of housing. Between 1956 and 1989, the state
constructed 72.3 million units (average annual production:
2.2 million units).6
Mikhail Gorbachev hopes to maintain a high level of
production while at the same time restructuring the entire
housing delivery system. Under perestroika, the Soviet
government intends to create a market based economy, and
privatization of housing has been declared a high priority.
Sources at the State Committee for Architecture and Planning
(Goscomarchitecture) project that 70% of the state-owned
housing stock will be privatized by the year 2000.7
The government has declared the single family home to be the
preferred housing type of the future. Although this can be
attributed, in part, to the government's desire to improve
living conditions, it also has an economic basis. In the
past, the government has relied on the construction of
high-rise prefabricated concrete housing, a strategy which
requires enormous capital for plant and equipment. In
contrast, the construction of single family homes requires
relatively low investment in plant and equipment. As a
result, small privately held construction companies as well
as homeowners themselves could begin to reduce the
government's burden for providing housing to every citizen.
Some believe that, by shifting the responsibility of housing
away from the state and into private hands, the government
can revitalize the teetering Soviet economy. Currently,
occupants of state-owned housing live virtually rent-free:
only 3%-5% of an average household's official income is
needed to cover monthly rental expense. The government, on
the other hand, expends approximately 7 billion roubles
annually to maintain the housing stock in the Soviet
Union. 8 This sum will undoubtedly grow in the near future
as construction costs rise (due to declining productivity
and growing scarcity of raw materials) and as renovations
costs increase (due to the deterioration of the
prefabricated concrete buildings constructed during the
Khrushchev era).
In contrast to the increasing drain which housing is placing
on state resources, consumers in the Soviet Union are
accumulating personal wealth. In 1987, disposable income
approximated 586 billion roubles, of which 441 billion was
spent on food and consumer items. By year end, consumers
had deposited 24 billion roubles into the central bank.9
This is not surprising in view of the scarcity of consumer
goods available in the Soviet Union. By privatizing
housing, many believe that personal savings could be
transferred to productive investment.
Although transferring state-owned housing to private
ownership may offer specific benefits, it is not a panacea
for Soviet housing problems. The following analysis will
attempt to document some of the difficulties facing the
Soviet Union in regard to privatization of housing. It
should be noted that the observations in this analysis were
drawn from two weeks of field research in Leningrad. As a
result, they may have limited relevance to housing
conditions in other parts of the Soviet Union, and any
conclusions should only be viewed as exploratory. This
study is based upon a very limited perspective of the
Soviet housing problem.
In order to evaluate the impacts and feasibility of
privatization of housing in the Soviet Union, the analysis
is organized to address the following: the current system
for allocating housing, the Soviet political process and its
impact on privatization, housing affordability issues, and
cultural factors impacting privatization.
The following conclusions can be drawn from this research:
1. Based on observations in Leningrad, privatization is not a
remedy for the housing problem. Housing is symptomatic of a
larger set of sociopolitical, economic, and cultural issues
which left unresolved will hinder any proposal for solving
housing problems in Leningrad.
2. In Leningrad, any move towards transferring state-owned
housing to private hands must be preceded by a restructuring
of the basic tenets of housing allocation under the current
system. Housing can no longer be inextricably linked to the
political process and used as a method of reward.
Furthermore, the sectors which do encourage private
ownership under the current system of allocation (e.g., the
cooperative and individual home sectors) must be fostered
through the development and continuous availability of a
financing mechanism for individual owners and through the
development of a retail trade for building materials.
Proclamations and laws are not sufficient to foster the
growth of these sectors.
3. Privatization depends on local access to materials and
services. Thus, any move towards transferring ownership to
private hands must be accompanied by the elimination of
Gossnab's control of the supply of materials and the
establishment of a local distribution network. As the
analysis of Leningrad indicates, the centralized system of
supply restricts movement of goods and services -- thus
fostering inequality -- and creates artificial scarcity in
the economy. The primitive budgetary system of finance must
also be restructured and a housing finance mechanism must be
created to foster home purchases.
4. Any solution to the housing problem in Leningrad must be
predicated on a fundamental shift of responsibility for the
supply and allocation of housing from the state to the local
level. Without strong local control, particularly in the
hands of local elected representatives such as the Leningrad
City Council, housing solutions are likely to repeat the
historical trends that have been deeply entrenched over the
last 70 years.
5. As the Leningrad example illustrates, the socialized economy
in the Soviet Union must be restructured. Wages must
reflect the real cost of living, and in-kind subsidy must be
made measurable so that the real cost of services provided
by the government are accounted for. The role of the
pervasive secondary economy in housing production that
currently operates in such areas as allocation and material
procurement must be recognized. This economy has strength;
it is one example where market forces are at. As a
result, it may be an appropriate starting point for the
expansion of privatization.
6. Finally, market economics depends on consumer values. As
a result, the deeply rooted tradition of collectivism and
authoritarianism and the institutionalized inequalities
which pervade the lives of Leningraders must begin to shift.
Taken a step further, consumer preferences must begin to
be expressed for privatization of housing to take hold.
ALLOCATION OF HOUSING IN LENINGRAD
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVATIZATION
In order to analyze the implications of privatization in the
Soviet Union, it is important to understand what housing is
available and how it is allocated. (See Tables I and II
below for dwelling types and forms of tenure).
Table I
DWELLING TYPES
PRIMARY HOUSING
Separate Flats: These apartment-style units are occupied by a
single household. In other words, the apartment is shared by
members of the same family (though not necessarily members of
the same nuclear family).
Communal Flats: This type of housing was created immediately
following the Revolution in accordance with the communist
doctrine calling for the dissolution of the family.
Although there were some notable buildings constructed in the
1920's which provided a model for communal living (e.g.,
communal dining facilities, communal day care, etc...), many
of the communal flats were created simply by splitting up the
homes of the pre-revolutionary nobility.
As a result, the living conditions in the communal flats are
among the worst in Leningrad. In addition to crowded
conditions, many are not equipped with hot water.
Furthermore, plumbing and electrical systems are often
primitive. Under perestroika, the elimination of this type
of housing has been emphasized.
Dormitories: This category of housing provides temporary
accommodation to students (military and civilian) and workers
who are not residents of Leningrad (limitchicki).
Nonresidents are distinguishable by the internal passport
system which requires all citizens to carry propiska. The
limitchicki come to Leningrad at the invitation of a factory
(often to perform the least desirable work) hoping that they
can somehow procure permanent residency. Sanitary conditions
in the dormitories are often poor due to lack of services and
crowding.
Specialized Housing: Specialized housing includes orphanages
and housing for the elderly. Although no data is available
on this type of housing for Leningrad, only .5% of the total
populatigg in the Soviet Union occupies specialized
housing.
Individual Housing: Individual Tusing for primary residency
does not exist in Leningrad. However, it encompasses
approximately 12 25% of primary housing stock throughout the
Soviet Union. This type of Aousing is held by individual
citizens as personal property.
SECONDARY RESIDENCES
Official data is not available on secondary housing in the
Soviet Union. However, estimates of the number of Leningrad
families which have seTgndary homes ranges from one in six to
one in four Leningrad.
Dachas: The dacha is often a run-down cottage which served as
the primary residence for some previous generation. Dachas
are located either on individual lots or on land which is
held by a homebuilding cooperative.
Kitchen garden plots: Kitchen garden plots are small parcels
(600 square meters) intended for use as gardens. In theory,
there are strict laws regulating what can be built on these
lots to insure that they are maintained for cultivation only.
However, law enforcement seems to ebb and flow. In recent
years, enforcement in the Leningrad region has been lax, and
this has given rise to the construction of many makeshift
summer cottages on the plots.
There are at least two types of kitchen garden plots: one in
which the maximum size of the building structure cannot
exceed 20 square meters and one in which the maximum size g
the building structure cannot exceed 50 square meters.
Generally, the kitchen garden plots are held by homebuilding
cooperatives.
Table II
FORMS OF TENURE
State-owned housing: State-owned housing is held by the city
or state government, or by a factory, a trade union, or some
other enterprise of the state. It is provided to residents
for a nominal rental fee (3%-5% of official household
income). Occupants of state-owned housing are rarely
evicted, and they are entitled to transfer their Tgcupancy
rights to family members upon death of the occupant.
Cooperative housing: Cooperative housing entitles the
occupant to use of the dwelling as owner of a share in the
cooperative. Although cooperative dwellings can be exchanged
and inherited, the laws which define the rights of
cooperative owners are much more ambiguous than thg7 laws
outlining the rights of state-owned housing occupants.
State cooperative housing is provided by the Leningrad
City Council and is usually located in high-rise
industrial buildings in the suburbs of Leningrad.
These dwellings are procured at a considerably
higher cost than the state-owned housing. What
seems to determine the price differential is the
shorter waiting list for state cooperatives. In
Leningrad, the waiting list for state cooperative
housing is one to three years compared to the ten yegg
wait which currently exists for state-owned housing.
Homebuilding cooperatives are usually organized
through a factory or a trade union. They can be found
in the countryside and are formed for use by individual
homebuilders either for primary or secondary
residency.In the homebuilding cooperative, the
cooperative association is given access to a parcel of
land which is then divided for use by individuals.
Individual Plots: Some single family homes for primary and
secondary residency are located on individual plots of land
granted to individual citizens for use. In these cases, the
individual owns the building as personal property.
In Leningrad, the housing problems are somewhat unique.
This is largely due to the fact that the city's downtown has
remained virtually unchanged since the 18th and 19th
centuries when it was the capital of the Russian Empire.
Much of the housing stock in the downtown area consists of
low-rise buildings (built during this period), which were
converted to communal flats at the time of the Revolution.
As a result, the shortages among the city's 4.9 million
residents are especially grave. Only 56% of the population
occupies separate flats. The remaining citizens live either
in communal flats (36%) or dormitories (8%). (See Appendix
A for population and housing data).
ALLOCATION OF PRIMARY RESIDENCES
The Soviet housing system is based on the communist
philosophy calling for the elimination of social
inequality. Prior to the Revolution, housing in Russia
(as in many places in the world) was a source of
considerable inequality. Consequently, the Soviet
constitution made the provision of housing a right, and
the state created a strict distribution system. Spatial
norms and eligibility categories were created to insure that
all citizens were provided with a minimum standard of
living. However, because housing has always been linked
to the political process and used to reward those who are
perceived as the greatest contributors in society, this
distribution system is riddled with inequality.
The system of spatial norms designates the minimum amount of
space to which a person is entitled. Since the Revolution,
these norms have changed on three occasions. Immediately
following the Revolution, the standard was set at 8.25
square meters per person. In 1926 the standard was raised
to nine square meters per person, and under perestroika the
standard has been raised again to twelve square meters.
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Unfortunately, because of the continuous housing shortages,
these standards merely serve as guidelines for new
construction, and the state has another set of standards --
a much lower set of standards -- to designate a person's
eligibility for an improvd unit. Under these standards, a
person who can prove that he/she has less than 5.5 square
meters of living space is eligible to be placed on a waiting
list for state-owned housing, and a person who can prove
that he/she has less than 6.5 square meters of living space
is eligible to be placed on a waiting list for state
cooperative housing. 21
In addition to spatial norms, there are various other
categories used to designate eligibility. One source in
Leningrad said there were as many as 17 distinct categories
of eligibility.22 However, no one interviewed could
reconstruct this list.
The more important of these categories are for people living
in communal flats who either participated in World War II or
who survived the siege of Leningrad during the war. Others
16
given preference on the waiting lists are people who live in
communal flats and suffer certain medical conditions, people
who have completed military service, invalids from any of
the post-revolutionary wars, heros of labor, and families
with three or more children.23 These people are given
priority on the waiting lists because their contributions to
Soviet society are valued.
The reward system is not only limited to people on the
waiting lists. In fact, there are those who (because of
their positions in society) are entitled to bypass the
waiting lists altogether. For instance, the nomenklatura
(which is comprised of political and military officials and
ranking members of cultural, educational, economic,
scientific, and worker organizations) are given preferential
treatment in housing allocation.
What is interesting about all of these categories for
allocating housing, aside from the fact that housing
specialists in Leningrad could not identify them clearly, is
that they do differentiate people -- everyone is equal,but
some people are more equal. Many of these seem to rely on
subjective criteria. For example, it is unclear what
medical conditions make a person eligible for the waiting
list and who makes the decision that a condition is severe
enough to warrant eligibility. It is also unclear what
designates a person a hero of labor, and how far the
preferential treatment given to the nomenklatura extends?
David Shipler recounts the story of a Moscow citizen who
lived in a tiny flat with his mother, his wife of eight
years, and their child. In desperation to procure a
separate flat for himself, his wife, and his child, he had
his mother sign a statement that she could not tolerate his
wife, and he had his mother-in-law sign a statement that she
could not tolerate him. This declaration of incompatibility
allowed him to enter the waiting list for a state
cooperative, and after waiting four years and paying 2,500
roubles for each room, he procured a separate flat. He did
not register his address change, however, in order to
protect his right to his mother's flat when she died. (If
he had removed his name from her flat, the flat would have
reverted to the state upon his mother's death). 24
Although this example takes place in Moscow, it describes a
process which reoccurs throughout the Soviet Union.
Despite what appear to be rigid standards for allocation,
the criteria used for distribution is ambiguous and subject
to the judgement of individual officials.
As a result, personal relationships play an important role
in the allocation of housing. Exchanging goods and services
unofficially through friends or family relations is a
pervasive element of Soviet life. With respect to the
housing allocation system, procuring a larger apartment or
an apartment in a more desirable location can often be made
simple as a result of knowing the right person in the right
ministry.
Unofficial negotiations between apartment dwellers are
common. Various people interviewed in Leningrad
described how they had procured their flats. Almost all of
them had made informal payments to the previous occupant of
the apartment. One man, a Moscow citizen who was a member
of a theatre repertory company, explained that, in order to
procure his three room cooperative, he had made a $7,000
cash payment to the previous occupant. Based on the
exchange rate offered by the central bank, this equates to
42,000 roubles -- more than the average citizen earns in
official wages in a lifetime. Another member of this
theatre group had made a payment of 14,000 roubles (equal to
four and one half years of wages based on the official
average) to procure his three room apartment.
The spread of glasnost has led to the uncovering of some of
the inequalities which exist in the housing allocation
system, particularly those which exist from preferential
treatment for the nomenklatura.25 Several months ago,
"Fifth Wheel" (a progressive Leningrad television news
show) prepared a controversial expose on the vacation homes
of Leningrad's high military and political officials.2 6
This sort of exposure and public criticism was nonexistent
until recently.
EXCHANGE SYSTEM
Exchanges of both state-owned and state cooperative housing
can be accomplished through the Exchange Bureau, an agency
which falls under the Leningrad Executive Committee. Each
month, the bureau publishes a book of apartment listings,
which closely resemble the advertisements in the real estate
sections of American newspapers. Officially, when an
exchange takes place (on terms negotiated by the parties),
an agreement is signed and registered with the bureau. This
enables the parties involved in the exchange to procure new
residency documents (propiska). Exchanges take anywhere
from one to three years, and they are often arranged among
.27
many parties.
Interestingly, people in Leningrad prefer to use informal
networks to exchange flats over the official booklet. This
takes place through notices pasted on walls around the city.
ALLOCATION OF SECONDARY HOUSING
Secondary housing allocation is not monitored officially.
Families seem to procure secondary homes through
word-of-mouth. Payment for dachas or kitchen garden
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cottages is negotiated between the buyer and the seller.
One Estonian indicated that he had purchased his dacha (part
of a homebuilding cooperative) in 1989 for 25,000 roubles.
Another family indicated that they had purchased their
kitchen garden cottage in the Leningrad region in 1980 for
4,500 roubles. This family estimated that they could sell
the cottage today for 20,000 roubles.
To purchase a plot of land for a secondary home, payment is
made the city or town where the plot is located and to the
cooperative association (in the case that the plot is
located on a cooperative parcel). One cooperative visited
had been organized by the employees of a local factory.
There were 250 shareholders in this cooperative, many of
whom had recently begun constructing cottages. One of these
families reported that they had paid a fee to the
cooperative for use of the land -- in this case 1,000
roubles. In the future, they would make an annual payment
of 30 roubles to the town for continued use of the land.
Total construction cost for their brick cottage was
estimated at 10,000 roubles. The family hoped the value of
their cooperative share would reach 30,000 roubles upon
completion of the cottage.
The secondary home in the Soviet Union is paradoxical. Its
allocation, though informal, is sanctioned by the
government. One official described the secondary home as a
deeply rooted tradition among Soviet people which originated
long before the revolution. Through the dacha or the
kitchen garden plot, Mr. Nazarov argued, "people are able to
satisfy their desire to build their own homes and enjoy the
leisurely activity of gardening."28 Although the secondary
home is a tradition, it is also an appeasement: a way for
the government to escape changing the inadequate system of
producing and allocating primary housing.
CURRENT ALLOCATION SYSTEM
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVATIZATION
Despite efforts by the government to standardize the living
conditions of all Soviet citizens, there are people who are
able to procure better dwellings than others; the current
system is based upon inequality. Therefore, the argument
used by some that privatization would create inequality
should be disregard. Instead, the feasibility of
privatization should be explored.
Both the cooperative and the individual home sectors have
been in existence since the revolution. This is worth
noting because, under perestroika, these sectors have been
proclaimed as vehicles through which privatization can
occur. According to Mr. Aganbegyn, one of the leading
Soviet economists under perestroika,
"It is difficult to overestimate the vital
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importance of our plan to create a pluralist
attitude to property. There is a powerful
movement, which is encouraged by the state, for
the creation of cooperatives... for the development
of individual domestic holdings, for the
individual construction of housing anggfor private
gardening and allotment cultivation."
The cooperative movement originated in the 1920's. However,
the Soviet Government has always exhibited ambivalence
towards its growth. Under Lenin's New Economic Policy, the
cooperative movement was viewed by some as a tool for
transforming the masses from capitalism to socialism. In
fact, the house leasing cooperatives (one of two forms of
cooperatives established under Lenin) gained so much support
that by the mid-1930's these cooperative were managing 53
million square meters. There were,- however, those who
perceived the cooperative "as a heretical form of housing
tenure" both for its autonomous nature and for its
association with the bourgeois.30 Under Stalin,
opposition towards the cooperative sector grew, and by 1937
cooperatives were abolished.
In conjunction with Khrushchev's 1957 decree to eliminate
the housing shortage by 1970, cooperatives were reinstated.
This reinstatement had a pragmatic basis. By encouraging
the growth of the cooperative sector, the state could share
responsibility for solving the housing problem -- in much
the same way that the reforms under perestroika are viewed.
Khrushchev's 1957 decree was impotent, at first, because
it was not backed by concrete state support in the form of
financing. Even after financing was made available in 1962,
cooperatives have failed to achieve significant momentum.
Construction activity throughout the Soviet Union peaked in
the late 1960's and early 1970's at 7%-8% of total housing
construction.3 1  Although data is not available for
Leningrad, current figures for the entire Soviet Union
reveal that state cooperative housing comprises only 5% of
total housing stock.32
In Leningrad, the budgetary allocation for construction of
state cooperative housing was recently increased to 20% and,
according to one source at Lenniitag, the city council would
like to. increase this percentage even more.33 However,
there is trepidation that if more resources were allocated
for the construction of state cooperatives, the waiting list
for state-owned housing would grow even longer.
One reason for this fear is that there is little incentive
(aside from the shorter waiting list) to purchase a share
in a state cooperative. The rights of the shareholder are
ambiguous, and the costs are prohibitive. In Leningrad, a
one room flat costs 10,000 roubles, while a three room flat
may cost as much as 30,000 roubles. Between 50%-60% of this
cost is financiable over a 15-25 year period at a very low
rate of interest. However, a family still has to make a
sizable down payment of 5,000-15,000 roubles followed by
24
monthly payments of 40-60 roubles (vs. rental payments for
state-owned housing of 5-20 roubles per month).
Even if a family can afford to make these payments (and the
evidence suggests that many cannot), there is nothing to
differentiate the state cooperatives from the state-owned
housing. A cooperative visited in the "suburbs" of
Leningrad evidenced this. Although the apartment was lovely
as a result of the care its occupants took in decorating,
the interior finish was barely adequate, and the exterior
looked exactly like the thousands of state-owned building
blocks which surround the city. Furthermore, the location
offered no advantage.
The homebuilding cooperatives (which are only used for
secondary homes in the Leningrad region) and the individual
home sector (which does not exist in Leningrad) are also
private forms of tenure which have been emphasized by Mr.
Gorbachev. To encourage the growth of these sectors under
perestroika, financing has been made available to individual
citizens. However, it has only been made available on a
very limited basis. According to Valere Antonov, the Deputy
Managing Director at Lenniitag, 130,000 loan applications
went unfilled in Leningrad in 1989 due to "a shortage of
roubles at the state level". In 1990, there has been no
state construction money available for individual
homebuilders.34
A family which was fortunate enough in 1989 to get a
construction loan was only permitted to borrow between 5,000
and 10,000 roubles. At best, this would have covered 50% of
the cost of materials. 35 Because there are few state
building stores, materials are difficult to procure, and the
individual who chooses to build his/her own house must be
extremely resourceful. One alternative is through the black
market. However, this can be very expensive. Having a
personal relationship with someone who works in a
homebuilding factory is the preferred method of procurement
because it provides direct access to the system of
centralized supply. (See "Privatization and The Political
Process" for detail).
The growth of low density housing development -- implicit in
the expansion of either the homebuilding or the individual
home sectors -- would require an overhaul of the centralized
planning process. Because the planning system is oriented
towards the development of large scale industrialized
housing blocks, it is extremely inflexible. Large resource
and capital allocations must be made for each project to
provide the necessary infrastructural improvements and
transportation networks. This prevents the development of
roads and infrastructure needed for the growth of low
density housing.
The cooperative and individual home sectors have been in
existence since the Revolution. However, they only
encompass 30% of the primary housing stock in the Soviet
Union.36 This is largely attributable to the fact that the
Soviet government has never been willing to loosen its hold
on centralized authority in order to foster their growth.
PRIVATIZATION AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS
". the process of privatization does not mean
handing state property over to private ownership,
as some people think. It is really a search for
new, decentralized forms for management of state
property in capitalist countries. Therefore the
significance of this phenomenon... becomes even
greater (in socialist countries], and the term
privatization is... inadequate to describe this
complicated process. It might.. .be more accurate
to call the process socialization... since the
process is one of advancing property to people, of
liquidating7 the alienation of people from their
property."
In other words, privatization depends on decentralization.
Although this observation is astute, it is difficult to
imagine how the process of decentralization can take place
in the Soviet Union where centralized authority has been
paramount throughout history. The Russian Empire was the
home of leaders such as Ivan the Terrible and Peter the
Great, both of whom were supreme autocrats. A 16th century
French ambassador to Russia made the following observation:
"I cannot say whether it is the character of the Russian
nation which has formed such autocrats, or whether it is the
autocrats themselves who have given this character to the
nation."38 In the 20th century, the Soviet Union has seen
the rise of Joseph Stalin who created many of the central
political policies which still exist today.
The tendency towards political centralization is an
impediment to the privatization of housing. In the Soviet
Union, all important decisions are made at the highest level
of government. Decisions regarding the allocation of
material and financial resources are made by two separate
agencies both of which report directly to the Supreme
Soviet.39 Gossnab is the government's central supply
agency, through which all raw materials and supplies in the
Soviet Union are distributed. Gosplan is the government's
financial planning agency which oversees the national
budget. Until the "self-financing enterprises" were
introduced under perestroika, the financial affairs of all
enterprises were managed by Gosplan. 40
Land planning is conducted by Genplan, the central master
planning institute. Master plans designating land use
throughout the USSR are prepared every 15-25 years. These
are then used by the local officials to guide development.
High-rise housing designs remain uniform throughout the USSR
This is attributable, firstly, to strict state design and
construction regulations. Secondly, there is a strong ethic
among the state construction organizations which encourages
simplicity and discourages technological change. These
organizations provide ultimate approval of the design
process. Consequently, even through new housing designs are
created by local architects for the local homebuilding
factories every five to seven years, the appearance of the
buildings never changes.
Finally, centralized control disempowers the local Soviet
governmental bodies. Historically, they have served merely
as adminstrators of policy passed down to them from the
state.
CENTRALIZED SUPPLY SYSTEM
One obstacle to privatization of housing is the centralized
supply system which operates throughout the Soviet Union.
All material resources are distributed by the state. In
addition, prices for these materials are set by the state.
Prices are not determined based on the forces of supply and
demand, but instead, they are set to satisfy a political or
ideological agenda or to balance the state budget. As a
result, the financial mechanism in the Soviet economy is
extremely primitive. It is material procurements which
drive Soviet economic behavior.
Unfortunately, the emphasis on material procurements creates
a "hoarding" mentality in which state factories and
enterprises stockpile materials. By stockpiling, managers
not only secure against future scarcity, but they also
create business opportunities for themselves. Stockpiling
leads to an artificial scarcity in which everyone must
negotiate to procure the materials needed to build the
quantity of housing which the state has budgeted for a
particular municipality. According to one source, the job
of the local planner is to be the best "beggar".4
If local ministries have to beg to procure building
materials and individual builders have to break the law to
procure building materials, the prospect of creating normal
market relations is extremely limited.
CENTRALIZED PLANNING
The centralized land planning process in the Soviet Union is
also problematic for privatization. Master plans are
created many years in advance with very little input from
local planners. This leads to inefficient use of local
resources. In Leningrad, for instance, the soil conditions
are very wet, and foundation systems utilizing spread
footings would be most suitable. However, because state
guidelines call for the use of piles (a more expensive
foundation system), the method which would be most efficient
is not used.
The development of high-rise industrial housing is an
inflexible system which consumes resources and capital at an
enormous rate. Construction costs for high-rise building
are much higher than they would be for low-rise and single
family construction. Furthermore, the Soviets' reliance on
prefabricated concrete construction necessitates
considerable investment in plant and equipment. Finally,
large capital and resource allocations must be made to
satisfy infrastructural improvements and public
transportation networks for each development. As a result,
the state has little remaining to develop infrastructure for
non-state housing.
With respect to land and resource allocation, priority seems
to be given to the industrial and military sectors. Because
of the Soviet ideological agenda, which calls for continued
industrial and military expansion, the housing sector is a
lower priority. Even during peak construction years, the
housing sector was allocated only a small percentage of the
state budget. In 1960, for example, only 15% of the state
budget was allocated to housing. In recent years, as the
Soviet economy has become increasingly stagnant, this
percentage has diminished. In 1987, only 8% percent of the
state budget was allocated to the housing sector.42 In a
market system, housing is recognized by the government as an
important sector of the economy, in large part, because it
serves as a store for individual wealth. This recognition
insures credibility in the marketplace and fosters the
growth and stability of a financial mechanism for housing.
If housing were transferred to private hands in the Soviet
Union, the government would similarly need to acknowledge
its importance in the economy.
Historically, housing development has excluded the consumer
from participating in the design and construction process.
Because the state is a monopoly, there is no competition in
the housing sector; the state, as producer, has no
incentive to recognize consumer preferences. This creates
a dilemma for privatization because it fosters an uneducated
buyer. In fact, the consumer in the Soviet Union may not
only be uneducated but complacent. The following anecdote
from The Glasnost Reader suggests that the state has been
skilled at instilling the belief that housing is a gift as
well as a constitutional right:
The railing in a stairwell of a residential
building has just been painted. "It turned out
nice. Such a noble dark green color. You can
even say that it had shades of red. Or was it
rust that was coming through the paint? No one
knows. Only it came out.. .not too ugly." Three
days pass and the paint does not dry. The
explanation by the building's chairman is
"'Comrades, you can't place unrealistic
expectations on this paint. Give it time, it'll
dry... '" Two weeks pass, and the tenants call the
painter. After the painter explains that the
paint has probably been made with the wrong type
of oil (but that it will undoubtedly evaporate
soon, leaving the railing with streaks), the
chairman says, "'...it's just as well. If it'll
[sic] be with streaks, the dirt won't
show'".. .Again the tenants are satisfied. After
several months pass, and the paint -- what is left
of it -- has begun to dry, the narrator exclaims,
"But one must remain an optimist and find good
sides in every sad situation. The paint... did not
really turn out to be that bad, and it was
affordable for the not rich [sic] folk. It came
off the suits. You did not even have to wash
them. It just disappeared by itself." In the end,
the entire 4groblem is blamed on the paint
manufacturer.
POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS
Decentralization of the decision-making process would be a
prerequisite for any move toward privatization. Local
governmental bodies must be empowered to take
responsibility for the supply and allocation of housing.
This transformation cannot occur through decrees passed
down from central authorities. Instead, it must take
place at a grass roots level.
Currently, the authority of the local ministries is
severely constricted because they have no direct link to the
Soviet work place. It is the state ministries which oversee
the factories and, because housing is used by many state
factories as a "carrot" to attract and hold workers, the
state ministries remain much more powerful than the local
authorities.
There have been occasional rumblings in the past of
transferring more power to local Soviets, yet none of these
efforts has proven successful. This is due largely to the
lack of political muscle behind the rhetoric. In the
Republic of Russia, ownership of state housing by the
local Soviets dropped from 46% of living space in 1940 to
27% in 1956. This decline led to the enactment of
legislation during the late 1950's and early 1960's to
promote the transfer of properties from the state ministries
to the local municipalities. However, the state
ministries, anxious to maintain their power
base, successfully discredited the administrative abilities
of the local Soviets, and in 1975 the local Soviets in the
Russian Republic had only increased their holdings to 35% of
the total state-owned housing stock.44
Under perestroika, there is some evidence that the local
Soviets are becoming more powerful. However, this gain is
limited to Moscow and Leningrad -- the only two cities in
the Soviet Union which have power over their local budgets.
Interestingly, before perestroika neither city even
exercised this power as a result of the long-standing
reliance on decision-making from above.45
In Leningrad, through the election process in early
1990, LENSOVIET (Leningrad's legislative body) became, for
the first time in history, a governmental body with real
political power. In the past, elections were nothing more
than a formality; one candidate who was hand picked by
senior officials was elected. All local authority was held
by ISPOLCOM, the executive committee which maintained direct
links to the central authorities. Because the head of
ISPOLCOM is appointed by LENSOVIET, the 1990 elections
effectively transferred power from the executive agency to a
legislative body. This is an important step in shifting the
political process from a centrally based system to one in
which local authorities are empowered. The new chiefs of
both LENSOVIET and ISPOLCOM are strong advocates for
privatization and the establishment of a market economy.
However, their hold on leadership is tenuous -- as reflected
in the recent rumblings by more conservative elements of the
communist party.
A poll taken by the Moscow News Weekly on five occasions
between March, 1989 and March, 1990 shows that even if the
local Soviets are able to gain power, they may not receive
the confidence of the Soviet people needed to fully
transform the political system. The poll asks "Whom do we
trust?". Responses show that the local Soviets are among
the least trusted organizations in the Soviet Union,
paralleled only by law enforcement on two occasions by and
religious organizations on one occasion. The most trusted
organization on all five occasions was the Supreme
Soviet.46
Perhaps what is even more critical for the success of
privatization than the historical lack of a local
participation in the political process is the national
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crisis of ideology -- a phenomenon which persists under
perestroika.
As in past reforms, Mr. Gorbachev's movement has produced a
myriad of new rhetoric which seems to attempt to integrate
the proposed reforms into the existing communist system.
Mr. Aganbegyan suggests that the process of privatization is
one of socialization (not merely transferring ownership).
In interviews at Lenniitag, Mr. Gorbachev's philosophy was
described as "developing socialism with a human face".
In spite of all this rhetoric, little has really changed in
the basic structure of the Soviet political system to
transform economic relations.
The difficulties arising from this are exemplified in one of
the exposes produced by Hedrick Smith for "Inside
Gorbachev's USSR", which describes the plight of an
entrepreneur who has recently purchased a brick factory in
Novgorod.47 Mr. Masarsky plans to launch a homebuilding
business. Under perestroika, he has been able to form a
cooperative. However, because of the monopolistic operation
of the state, he is unable to successfully run his business.
The state controls production and the allocation of
supplies. When Mr. Masarsky needs materials, he must
compete with the state enterprises, which are already
"begging" for materials. Then, in order to pay for
materials (if he is able to procure them) he must perform
services for the state. This leaves him little opportunity
to operate as a private venturer.
Efforts to contact Mr. Masarsky upon arrival in Leningrad
made the gravity of his situation apparent. At first, state
officials denied the existence of his business altogether.
When they finally acknowledged that his firm existed, they
indicated that he has been forbidden to build anything in
the city of Novgorod. Under the law, Mr. Masarsky is
permitted to form a private business. However, because
the system remains unchanged, he is unable to operate.
Clearly, the constraints which are imposed on Mr.Gorbachev
by the conservative forces in the Communist Party a're
enormous. In a system of government where ideology and
reality are not easily reconcilable, people have learned how
to make use of the communist doctrine for their own ends.
In the Soviet Union, professionalized politics is the name
of the game. David Shipler notes,
"The ideological heritage has passed from thinkers
and theoreticians to the textile engineers and
metallurgists, the Brezhnevs, Andropovs, and
Chernenkos whose interests in the everyday
business of economic management have naturally
prevailed over the more intellectual activity of
enriching ideological thought... Consequently,
Soviet Communists are... dedicated to the
maintenance and improvement of e existing system
of elaborate state ownership."
Khrushchev's attempted reforms failed as a result of the
same conservative forces which are constraining perestroika.
Although Mr. Gorbachev has added another ingredient to his
reforms (glasnost), his ultimate success at dismantling the
conservative forces within the communist party is tenuous.
Privatization cannot take place unless the liberal factions
of the Soviet political system are fostered.
AFFORDABILITY ISSUES IMPACTING PRIVATIZATION
In spite of the recent growth in individual savings in the
USSR, the following analysis suggests that housing
affordability would be problematic if a privatization
program were adopted. Official wages are low compared to
living expenses. However, household income in the Soviet
Union also includes an unofficial component: income earned
from the secondary economy. Income earned from this sector
of the economy (which is highly developed) is not
measurable. As a result, it is difficult to ascertain real
affordability. It is also difficult to imagine a successful
privatization program under the present wage structure.
Because the Soviet economy is socialized, wages -are low and
the consumer has little purchasing power.
INCOME PROFILE AND THE SECONDARY ECONOMY
The average official income per capita for citizens in the
Soviet Union is reported to approximate 200 roubles per
month. However, based on income data prepared in 1989, 70%
of the population earns below 200 roubles per month.49 In
Leningrad, the average official income per capita
approximates 140 roubles per month.50 Based on the average
household size (2.7 persons in Leningrad), it is possible to
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create a hypothetical income profile. For illustrative
purposes, the household will be comprised of two adults and
one child. The official household income, in this case,
would equal 280 roubles per month. Offsetting this income
would be taxes and living expenses. Taxes (pro-rated on a
monthly basis) would approximate 36 roubles (13% of official
income), and food costs would equal roughly 250 roubles per
month.51 Finally, rent for a two room apartment (including
utilities and phone) would approximate 10 to 15 roubles per
month. Already this family's monthly expenses exceed their
official income. How, then, are they able to pay for
clothing? Even domestically manufactured clothing is
expensive: a pair of ladies shoes (made in the Soviet Union)
could cost as much as 75 roubles and a ladies outfit (made
in the Soviet Union) might cost 100 to 150 roubles.52
Based on the above information, one would logically conclude
that affordability is a critical barrier to transferring
housing to private ownership in the Soviet Union. In the
Leningrad region, prices for state housing cooperatives
range from 10,000-30,000 roubles, and dachas and kitchen
garden cottages seem to range from 10,000-30,000 roubles.
Financing, though advertised, is not really available.
Nevertheless, at least one in four families in Leningrad is
estimated to own secondary homes.53 How is this possible?
An important element of household income cannot be found in
the state economy. In the Soviet Union, there is a vast
secondary economy. Although there is no official data on
the income earned in this economy, Sovietologist Gregory
Grossman, of the University of California-Berkely, found
that other sources of income from the recent emigres of
Leningrad's working class totalled 38% of city's official
wages.54 According to sources at Lenniitag, 30%-50% of the
institute's 70 employees hold second jobs to supplement
their official income.55 These include such activities as
dressmaking, private tutoring, graphic design, and auto and
home repair.
In fact, according to estimates prepared by Gosplan, goods
and services which are provided outside of the state economy
may approach $150 million per year (or 11% of the gross
domestic product).56 Research prepared by Nikolai Shmelev,
a Soviet economist, reveals that 83% of the Soviet
population purchases goods and services in the secondary
economy. According to Mr. Shmelev, in cities, 40% of auto
repairs, tailoring, and shoe repairs are performed in the
secondary economy and 50% of apartment repairs are performed
in the secondary economy.57
Often the secondary economy does not even involve the
exchange of money. Because the Soviet Union is a country of
shortage, the barter system is highly developed. Exchanging
one good or service for another is common. In his article
"Inside the 'Collapsing' Soviet Economy", Richard Parker
describes a meal in which he partook in Moscow during one of
his visits. As always, his hostess was enormously
resourceful. She had grown the vegetables at her kitchen
garden plot, purchased the meat from a cooperative,
purchased the cakes from a neighbor, received the figs from
a relative in Georgia, and traded the wine and chocolates
for theatre tickets.58
The magnitude of the secondary economy is supported by the
growing rate of savings in the Soviet Union. The savings
rate in 1987 was 24 billion roubles, and, according do one
source at Lenniitag, many citizens do not even store their
wealth in savings due to a lack of confidence in the banking
system.59 Twice since the Revolution -- in 1941 and in 1961
-- there have been currency reevaluations. Although in
1961, people were permitted to exchange their old roubles
for the new ones, this was not the case in 1941. As a
result, there may be many, particularly among older
citizens, who store their money "under their mattresses". It
is also noteworthy that during periods when the state has
been especially vigilant of anti-communist behavior (e.g.,
under Stalin and Breshchnev), the government has checked
bank accounts to verify income sources.60
Based on the above information, it can be assumed that
Soviet citizens earn more than they appear to. Although the
government began taxing unofficial income in July of 1990,
it is not clear how this new tax system will be enforced.
If it is enforced, there should be governmental data in the
near future on the secondary economy. In the meantime,
affordability cannot really be evaluated based on income.
Moreover, regardless of actual income, it appears that many
Soviet citizens do not believe that they can afford private
housing. A study prepared by one of Leningrad's most
respected sociologists in 1989 surveyed 1,200 residents
regarding their ability and desire to build and own their
own homes. When asked what the respondents could afford to
pay for a single family home, 50% said that they could not
afford a house under any conditions. It is noteworthy that
the question required respondents to consider both payment
outright and payment under a long-term credit plan.61
Although the results of this study cannot be regarded as
having any real quantitative significance (because the
perception of affordability was not, in many cases, related
to actual income), it can be used as a general guide. If
the Soviet people do not perceive that they can afford to
own their own homes, privatization is unlikely to succeed.
THE AUTOMOBILE
Another important factor related to affordability which
would impact privatization is the inaccessibility of cars.
Cars, which have been extremely important to the growth of
the land markets in the United States, are prohibitively
expensive in the Soviet Union. If one is willing to wait as
long as five years, one can purchase a car from the state
auto manufacturer (Lada) for 10,000 roubles. It is also
possible to avoid the wait by purchasing a car on the black
market. However the cost can be as high as 30,000 roubles.
As a result, only one person in ten has a car in the Soviet
Union (vs. six in ten in the United States).62 In
Leningrad, only one person in twenty has a car.63
Currently, due to the scarcity of cars, families who own
secondary homes (which comprise one of the only privatized
forms of tenure) rely on public transportation to travel to
these homes. If the primary housing stock were to be
substantially privatized, the lack of individual
transportation would be an impediment.
WAGE STRUCTURE
In the above hypothetical household, the aggregate annual
income generated from official sources would approach 3,360
roubles. Excluding the likely possibility of unofficial
sources of income (which cannot be quantified), this
household is barely subsisting. One of the problems with
the income structure in the Soviet Union is that while wages
are low, households receive enormous in-kind income in the
form of rent subsidy, transportation subsidy, free health
care, free education, and free pension benefits. The
nomenklatura as well as workers at certain designated
factories or state enterprises also receive access to scarce
consumer products.
Income taxes, though they exist, are token compared to the
cost of all of these services. For privatization to take
hold, the real cost of services must be accounted for.
Costs for services provided by the state must be reflected
in the tax structure, and costs for services incurred by
citizens must be reflected in the wage structure.
Otherwise, people have no purchasing power.
Restructuring the socialized economy in the Soviet Union is
a major undertaking. In order for privatization of
housing to succeed, the wage structure must be revised to
provide purchasing power and the secondary economy must be
reckoned with.
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CULTURAL ISSUES IMPACTING PRIVATIZATION
The Soviet Union occupies 1/6 of the earth's land area (22.4
million square kilometers). Over 100 ethnic groups are
represented among its 280 million citizens. Because of its
vast area and its varied population, Soviet society
encompasses enormous diversity. In spite of subjugation by
the Soviet sociopolitical machine, all of the 20 republics
have distinct historical and cultural traditions.
There are, however, some common elements of Soviet society
which impact privatization of housing. Given the deeply
rooted tradition of collectivism and authoritarianism, it is
important to consider whether the people are willing to
accept the personal responsibility and risks which would
accompany private ownership. Inequality in Soviet life is
institutionalized, and although this problem is one which
plagues many societies, it cannot be remedied simply by
implementing a market economy. Finally, family alliances in
the Soviet Union are distinct and should be carefully
examined with respect to privatization.
COLLECTIVISM AND AUTHORITY
"The sense of individual desire and personality
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submerged in the broader group... is much more than
a fragment of Marx and Engels polished by Lenin
and stuck like an irritating splinter into Russian
flesh. It has been absorbed into the structure of
values and mores so that its violggion stimulates
genuine revulsion in many people."
In the Soviet Union, collectivism is an essential element of
the culture which can be traced back to the blood-related
tribal communities organized by the ancient Slavs. In the
19th century, the Russian peasantry held land collectively
through communal villages (even though each family farmed
individually), and under Soviet rule, the kolkhoz (or
collective farm) was established. The ethic of
collectivism creates an important obstacle to privatization
because it discourages differentiation among people.
There is a Russian proverb which asserts that "In a field of
wheat, only the stalk whose head is empty of grain stands
above the rest."65 Under Soviet rule, collectivism has
served the communist party as a mechanism of social control.
Joseph Stalin created a legacy of fear which endures among
Soviets even today. As a result, three and four generations
of people have learned, by necessity, not to differentiate
themselves from others. David Shipler describes the
scientist who is likely to be viewed as an egoist for
supporting unorthodox experiments and the architect who
avoids claiming authorship of an innovative plan to prevent
accusations by others that he is seeking credit.66 The
long-standing tradition of collectivism has created a
society in which citizens are discouraged from developing
their individuality.
Under perestroika, the ethic of collectivism has been
challenged. By encouraging the forces of market economics,
Mr. Gorbachev has shaken this deeply rooted tradition. The
establishment of cooperative stores, for instance, calls on
citizens to accept price differentiation, and there are many
who refuse to shop at these stores because they are
unwilling to accept this new principle. Soviet people are
accustomed to uniformity, and when the price for milk
changes, they loose a sense of security.
Collectivism is valued by Soviet citizens because it
provides a sense of security. One employer, who had
recently attempted to promote his assistant, requested that
she sign a contract in which her performance would be
evaluated. She declined the promotion because she was
uncomfortable signing a contract. The security she
maintained in her old position was paramount. Mr.
Maslennikov, the Director of Lenniitag, has attempted to
remedy this sensitive issue by paying his employees a salary
plus a bonus. This preservqg the employees' sense of
security while encouraging them to strive for individual
success in their work.
Anna Maslennikov, a linguist at the University of Leningrad,
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explained that she had been offered a job for a cooperative
which would pay 1,000 roubles per month for working nine
hours per week. In her present position, she earned 200
roubles per month for working 18 hours per week. According
to Anna, this sort of differentiation makes people feel like
they have been working for nothing. It makes them question
what they are really worth. In a society driven by market
forces, this sort of questioning is essential. However, in
the Soviet Union where differentiation has been scorned for
so many years, it shakes the very foundation of people's
values.
One important theme in Soviet culture which is inextricable
from collectivism is the reliance on authoritarian
leadership. In the Russian Empire, serfdom was not
abolished until 1861. While Europe was undergoing rapid
urbanization accompanied by the rise of mercantilism (and
the middle class), Russia remained a rural empire with an
estate-like social structure. By 1915, only 15% of the
population occupied urban centers.67 Even as
industrialization took hold in the late 1800's, the role of
the factory bosses merely replaced the role of the nobility;
the proletariat grew as a subjugated class of people.
The issue of authoritarianism as it relates to the political
environment in Soviet Union, has been discussed above in
Section III ("Privatization and the Political Process").
David Shipler describes this phenomenon as ". ..the need for
a solid structure of allegiance in which to order and
explain reality." 68 Reliance on authority transfers
responsibility away from the individual and reduces personal
risk resulting from loss or failure. This is antithetical
to many of the tenets upon which America has based its
philosophy of private property. Although it would be
arrogant to suggest that privatization of housing in the
Soviet Union should be modelled after the system which
exists in the United States, it is difficult to imagine how
the Soviets can achieve privatization without reducing
their reliance on authority.
Under perestroika, Mr. Gorbachev has encouraged people to
form private business ventures. However, many seem
unwilling to accept the personal accountability and risk
which this entails. Hedrick Smith interviews several
farmers in his expose "Inside Gorbachev's USSR" who provide
the following insights: "To lease it means I have to work on
this land myself. But if the weather is nasty or something,
how will I manage? What if I do not have enough feed from
[sic] my cows? What if I do not have enough strength?"
Another farmer who was offered land and machinery leased by
the state as well as seed and fertilizer for a potato farm
said, "No, I won't take it." When asked why, he said, "No
rain, no potatoes.. .You are paying me a salary, right?.. .If
I lease from you, and there is no rain, I would still have
to work. But who will pay me? I have a loss, and then
there will be nothing to eat." 69
There are those who are forging ahead as entrepreneurs
under perestroika. Several cooperative owners met
expressed confidence that they could achieve success in
their business ventures. However, in analyzing the
prospects for privatization, the possibility that many may
not be willing to pay the personal cost for creating a
market system cannot be ignored.
The authoritarianism which the Soviet government has
espoused includes controlling the geographic movement of
people. The internal passport (propiska), which all
citizens are required to carry, prevents people from moving
without proper documentation. Moving from one region to
another is normally only accomplished as a result of a job
change. It is noteworthy that collective farmers were not
even given propiskas until 1974. Without this
documentation, they could not even leave their farms.
Moving to Moscow or Leningrad is especially difficult, and
those who hold propiskas in either city are looked upon, by
many, with envy. In fact, people have been known to arrange
their marriages in order to gain access to a propiska in
these cities.
Lack of mobility (due either to the previously mentioned
scarcity of cars or to the limitations imposed by the
propiska) poses an interesting problem for privatization
because it severely constrains the marketplace for private
ownership. In the United States, for instance, where real
estate prices are based upon demand, constricting supply
(e.g., through government regulation) results in rising
prices. One can surmise that constricting population
movement in the Soviet Union would similarly impact the
real estate market.
INEQUALITY
Inequality in the Soviet Union is deeply rooted, and it is
naive to assume that merely by altering economic
relationships, the powerful forces of history which have
fostered inequality will suddenly fall away. Soviet society
has functioned as a class system for centuries. Under Peter
the Great, for example, a military class structure (called
tchinn) was established, and the entire population was
classified into 14 official categories.70 It is notable that
this class structure was distinct from the system which
existed in Occidental Europe where classes were
distinguishable by their family names and their land
holdings. In contrast, under the system of tchinn a
person's position in society was directly linked to his/her
relationship to the imperial government and the czar.
With the Revolution, the class structure was to be
dissolved. Although the nobility was squashed, the class
structure did not dissolve. Today there are many classes of
people in the Soviet Union: the aparachik, the nomenklatura,
the intellectuals, the workers. Each is bestowed with
specific qualities.
Under Soviet rule, inequality has been institutionalized.
Section II described how the housing allocation system
provides the most desirable living accommodations to those
groups of people who are perceived to be society's greatest
contributors. The propiska is yet another example of
systematic inequality. As the above example of the
collective farmers indicates, use of the propiska
institutionalizes discrimination against certain groups.
Those who are well connected in the communist party are
granted permission to live in cities such as Moscow or
Leningrad. There, they are usually insured better living
accommodations and can gain access to the best educational
institutions.
The Soviet state also fosters inequality through the
distribution of goods and services. In theory, goods
produced in each republic are sold to Gossnab and then
redistributed. Thus, citizens throughout the USSR have
access to all of the same goods. In practice, however, this
is not the case. Some republics seem to have a much greater
supply of certain goods than others. This is, in part,
reflective of the widespread corruption within the system.
Because of overstocking and bartering at the enterprise
level, goods do not flow equally throughout the republics.
The Soviet system is built on the concept of social
equality, yet on many levels inequality is
institutionalized. As a result of this phenomenon, certain
groups are prevented from participating in the society on an
equal basis. If a market economy were established without
altering the societal norms of inequality, the inability
by some to participate equally in the economy would
prevail.
FAMILY
Finally, privatization must be evaluated in relation to the
family structure in the Soviet Union. At the time of the
revolution, the dissolution of the nuclear family was
considered paramount. "...the family, like the state, was
to wither away.. .Under communism, it would give up its major
functions, especially child rearing and property holding to
the society at large." The rapid growth of
industrialization which was accompanied by a shrinking labor
force quickly dampened this ideological agenda. In the
1930's, Stalin imposed the redomesticization of women.
Awards were created for mothers who produced large families,
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and the liberal abortion and divorce laws which had been
established under Lenin were curtailed or abolished. These
efforts to expand the work force, which began under Stalin
and which continued into the 1970's, were never successful.
In fact, the country still suffers from an insufficient
labor supply.72 The Soviet Government's failure to expand
its labor force was (and is) largely attributable to the
inadequate housing provided to Soviet citizens.
As a result of shifting ideological trends, the nuclear
family in the Soviet Union is in crisis. This has created a
number of social problems. For example, the divorce rate is
high (over 1/3 of marriages end in divorce), and
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responsibilities of women have become enormous. In
addition to taking equal responsibility for providing for
their families in the work place (90% of the women in
Leningrad work full time), many are still the primary
caretakers at home. 7 4 Furthermore, as the availability of
basic necessities continues to worsen, women spend more and
more of their time waiting in lines.
Several of these issues are problematic for privatization.
The rising divorce rate has created many of the same
economic problems which are facing the United States. More
and more households are headed by women. In the Soviet
Union, as in the U.S., women do not have the same earning
power that men do. Consequently, their ability to purchase
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housing, if it were privatized, would be limited -- even
more limited than the scenario presented in Section IV.
More importantly, families often share housing. It is not
uncommon to see households comprised of various relations.
In fact, family size in the Soviet Union is measured by the
number of persons in a household not by the number of
persons in a particular nuclear family. Children may marry
and remain with their parents, and older siblings may live
together. In part, this is the result of adapting to the
continuous shortage of housing. It may also be rooted in
collectivism. Family relations in the Soviet Union are very
important. Anna Maslennikov said that she and her husband
had been invited to move to Moscow several times, but on
each occasion they had declined because her relatives are in
Leningrad.
Defining the household unit presents an obvious dilemma for
privatization. Who buys the house? And who owns the house?
Is the land owned by all the members of the household? Or
does one person maintain title? These questions are complex
and to presume that they would be resolved by implementing a
privatization program is shortsighted.
The cultural issues presented in the above discussion should
be considered with respect to privatization of housing
because they reflect some of the basic values of Soviet
society. Under perestroika, many of these values are being
publicly debated. Although this public debate is likely to
be an important first step toward change, it is only a first
step.
CONCLUSIONS
The Soviets' plan to build 20-25 million new dwellings by
the year 2000, while at the same time restructuring the
delivery system so that 70% of all state-owned housing is
transferred to private ownership, must be viewed at this
point with a certain skepticism.
The current system for allocation of housing is fraught with
difficulty. Although the Soviet state has attempted to
provide a minimum standard of living for all of its citizens
through a complicated system of distribution, the
continuous shortages which result from an inadequate
production process have led to structural inequalities in
this system. Certain groups are able to procure better
housing than others as a result of having better access to
state organizations.
Historically, there have been several forms of tenure which
enable individuals to own their own homes (e.g., the
cooperative and the individual home sectors). However,
these have never gained enough state support to flourish.
Under perestroika, Mikhail Gorbachev has attempted to
encourage the growth of these sectors through establishing a
legal framework. Nevertheless, the lack of building
materials and financing continues to obstruct their growth.
The scarcity of building materials can be attributed, in a
large part, to the centralized system of supply which is
extremely inefficient. Even state construction
organizations often have to resort to unethical behavior to
procure needed supplies. Furthermore, the simplistic
budgetary system of management has prevented the growth of
any financing mechanism in the economy.
Centralized planning also creates a formidable barrier to
privatization. It ignores local and individual input in the
construction and design process and utilizes enormous
capital. The large scale allocations for infrastructural
improvements and transportation networks which accompany the
development of high-rise industrial housing leave little
funding and resources for the development of a private
housing sector. Unfortunately, because of the nature of the
political environment in the Soviet Union, centralized
systems are self-perpetuating. Local political bodies have
only recently begun to establish authority within the
system, but their powers are tenuous. Furthermore, the
political ideology which dominates economic relationships in
the Soviet Union is often abused by the central powers.
Affordability issues are critical to any privatization
program. Official income among Soviet citizens is low in
comparison to living expenses. However, there is strong
evidence that the secondary economy provides a significant
supplemental source of income. The barter system is highly
developed. Because the secondary economy has never been
monitored and the barter system is poorly suited to a market
economy, any move toward privatization would have to be
accompanied by a shift in the income structure in the Soviet
Union. Wages are low, in part, because the socialized
economy subsidizes most services. If a market economy were
adopted, wages would have to be restructured to provide
citizens with greater purchasing power.
Perhaps the greatest impediment of all to privatization lies
in the deeply rooted cultural traditions of collectivism and
authoritarianism which have discouraged differentiation
among people and prevented people from taking personal
responsibility and risk. Systematic inequality is also a
significant factor in Soviet culture which will not easily
die with the implementation of a market system. Finally, if
the Soviet government is to undertake such a radical
program, family relations must be closely examined.
The analysis presented in this paper was gained through two
weeks of fieldwork in Leningrad and through researching the
available literature (which is limited due to the rapid
changes which are taking place in the Soviet Union at
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present). As a result, the conclusions which follow should
be viewed as exploratory:
1. Based on observations in Leningrad, privatization is not a
remedy for the housing problem. Housing is symptomatic of a
larger set of sociopolitical, economic, and cultural issues
which left unresolved will hinder any proposal for solving
housing problems in Leningrad.
2. In Leningrad, any move towards transferring state-owned
housing to private hands must be preceded by a restructuring
of the basic tenets of housing allocation under the current
system. Housing can no longer be inextricably linked to the
political process and used as a method of reward.
Furthermore, the sectors which do encourage private
ownership under the current system of allocation (e.g., the
cooperative and individual home sectors) must be fostered
through the development and continuous availability of a
financing mechanism for individual owners and through the
development of a retail trade for building materials.
Proclamations and laws are not sufficient to foster the
growth of these sectors.
3. Privatization depends on local access to materials and
services. Thus, any move towards transferring ownership to
private hands must be accompanied by the elimination of
Gossnab's control of the supply of materials and the
establishment of a local distribution network. As the
analysis of Leningrad indicates, the centralized system of
supply restricts movement of goods and services -- thus
fostering inequality -- and creates artificial scarcity in
the economy. The primitive budgetary system of finance must
also be restructured and a housing finance mechanism must be
created to foster home purchases.
4. Any solution to the housing problem in Leningrad must be
predicated on a fundamental shift of responsibility for the
supply and allocation of housing from the state to the local
level. Without strong local control, particularly in the
hands of local elected representatives such as the Leningrad
City Council, housing solutions are likely to repeat the
historical trends that have been deeply entrenched over the
last 70 years.
5. As the Leningrad example illustrates, the socialized economy
in the Soviet Union must be restructured. Wages must
reflect the real cost of living, and in-kind subsidy must be
made measurable so that the real cost of services provided
by the government are accounted for. The role of the
pervasive secondary economy in housing production that
currently operates in such areas as allocation and material
procurement must be recognized. This economy has strength;
it is one example where market forces are at. As a result,
it may be an appropriate starting point for the expansion of
privatization.
6. Finally, market economics depends on consumer values. As a
result, the deeply rooted tradition of collectivism and
authoritarianism and the institutionalized inequalities
which pervade the lives of Leningraders must begin to shift.
Taken a step further, consumer preferences must begin to be
expressed for privatization of housing to take hold.
APPENDIX A
HOUSING AND POPULATION DATA IN LENINGRAD
ACTUAL
1986
TOTAL POPULATION
Breakdown2
RESIDENTS OF
SEPARATE FLATS
RESIDENTS OF
COMMUNAL FLATS
RESIDENTS OF
DORMITORIES
4,900,000
2,725,000
1,755,000
420,000
PROJECTED
2001
5,290,000
@4,877,000
@ 153,000
260,000
AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD
SIZE (EXCLUDING DORMITORIES)
TOTAL HOUSING AREA
IN SQ METERS
TOTAL LIVING 3AREA
IN SQ METERS3
TOTAL HOUSING AREA
PER CAPITA IN SQ METERS
TOTAL LIVING AREA 3
PER CAPITA IN SQ METERS3
ANNUAL CONSTRUCTION
VOLUME
76,000,000
47,500,000
17.0
10.6
1,700,000
104,100,000
63,570,000
20.7
12.6
2,300,000
1All figures (with the exception of
footnote ) were provided by Lenniitag.
those identified in
2 The breakdown of residents occupying separate and communal
flats was estimated for 2001 was based on average household
size.
3Living area in the Soviet Union excludes kitchens,
bathrooms and corridors within the dwelling.
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